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１ Introduction
Transitional economies are those that experienced a 
centrally planned mechanism for decades, but currently are 
changing to a market-based system. In the centrally planned 
mechanism, the provisioning of goods and services were 
mostly carried out by state-owned enterprises and under 
prices set forth by the governments. From the late 1970s to 
early 1990s, economic reform was initiated in almost all 
affected countries by adopting various market-based 
schemes. Some countries, such as China and Vietnam1 
(Kolodko, 2000, pp.34-35), chose a gradual reform 
approach by maintaining state control on sectors that were 
considered to be sensitive to the national economies and 
fully opening other market segments for private 
participation. Meanwhile, others used the “shock therapy” 
approach to achieve their reform target: they wanted to 
foster rapid change in the economic structure by 
implementing privatization and liberalization as soon as 
possible (Stiglitz, 1999; Godoy & Stiglitz, 2006). The 
Russian Federation case is a typical illustration of the shock 
therapy approach.2
The differences in economic reform can be seen in the 
case of mobile services provisioning in Russia and Vietnam; 
these two are ranked as the second and third largest 
transitional economies in terms of population, respectively 
(Russia has a population of 142.8 million, with an annual 
population growth rate of -0.5% in 20053 [Federal State 
Statistics Service, 2006], while Vietnam has a population 
of 82 million with a 1.4% annual population growth rate 
[Vietnam General Statistics Office, 2005]). Mobile services 
were first provided in Russia in 1991 and the country 
immediately allowed private participants to engage in the 
building and operating of mobile networks without any 
limitation. In 2006, there were three national and four 
regional mobile operators in Russia; all national mobile 
operators are fully private-owned, while the Federation 
holds minor equity shares in the four regional mobile 
operators. In comparison, mobile services were commenced 
in Vietnam in 1992 with limited private participation; all 
mobile operators were required to be state-owned4 as per 
legislation,5 and foreign companies could only invest in this 
sector under the form of business cooperation contracts.6 
This limitation was loosened in December 2005, allowing 
US companies the right to invest up to 49% of the 
registered capital of a Vietnamese mobile operator.7 This 
stipulation was further extended to all other foreign 
investors as of January 2007, when Vietnam officially 
became a World Trade Organization (WTO) member. Since 
2000, mobile penetration in Russia doubled yearly, and in 
2005, the penetration reached 86.5%, approximately 
threefold higher than the fixed rate. Standing modestly at 
10.84% in 2005, the mobile rate in Vietnam also surpassed 
the previous fixed rate (8.17%) in 2005. The rapid growth 
of mobile services in the surveyed countries confirms their 
advantages and substitution for fixed services in satisfying 
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Figure 1．Mobile Development in Russia and 
Vietnam – Subscriptions and Penetrations
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１　Vietnam formally initiated economic reform in 1986.
２　Economic reform was officially started in the Russian 
Federation in 1991.
３　Due to economic diﬃculties, many Russians decided to have 
fewer children or none at all, which caused the birth rate to 
decrease. Besides, the death rate increased because of the 
war in Chechnya, while average male life expectancy was only 
56 years. All these factors contributed to the negative 
population growth rate in Russia.
４　State-owned entities are entities in which the state holds 
more than 50% of their registered capital (Article 4, 
Enterprise Law 2005).
５　Article 38.1.a, Ordinance on Posts and Telecommunications 
2002
６　Law on Foreign Investment 1988 and 1996
７　US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, which originally 
came into eﬀect in December 2001
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the inhabitants` telecommunication needs.
Even while mobile development and liberalization in 
Russia and Vietnam are being reached at dissimilar levels, 
several comparable shortcomings remain in these newly 
created market-based systems. This research was 
undertaken based on the hypothesis that an independent 
regulator does neither exist in Russia nor in Vietnam and 
such absence negatively affects to the formation of a fair 
and competitive mobile market.
An independent regulator, as defined by the WTO 
Telecommunications Reference Paper, is a body “separate 
from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic 
telecommunications services” (WTO, 1996). When 
discussing independent telecommunications regulators, 
Tarjanne (1999) also clearly emphasized the separation 
between the regulators and their regulated industries. Later, 
Invent (2000) and Wu (2005) further expanded the 
definition of an independent regulator. They summarized 
that independence increases when the regulators are 
insulated from both political and operational pressures. 
Additionally, they presented a set of indicators to evaluate 
the regulators` dependence based on the relationship 
between the regulators and other state agencies and 
regulated industries, and to evaluate their attitudes toward 
users. Further, Invent (2000) and Wu (2005) expressed that 
independence can be achieved when fair decision making is 
available and when related parties have a chance to 
comment on the drafts of regulatory rules and decisions. 
They used two main indicators — public hearings and 
availability of regulatory developments on a regulatory 
website — to evaluate the fairness of decision making. 
However, regulatory decisions are not only limited to the 
issuance of rules, regulations and decisions, but extended to 
the application of such rules and regulations to govern the 
market. In its document submitted to the WTO (WTO, 
1999), the United States pointed out that independence can 
be attained when “a predictable and fair legal and regulatory 
framework” is developed to ensure that “the same rules 
apply to everyone and that rules apply consistently” (UNDP 
Vietnam & MPI, 2005, p.48) and that the regulators can 
not employ their own subjective point of view in making a 
decision and deny that necessary rules are absent. 
Moreover, the authors believe that in order to achieve 
independence, the regulatory decision-makers themselves 
must be qualified and experienced to utilize various rules 
and regulations in making a decision. Figure 2 illustrates 
relevant indicators to measure the independence of 
regulators in governing the mobile telecommunications 
market.
These indicators were employed to analyze the cases 
of Russia and Vietnam to prove the research’s hypothesis. 
The main source for analyzing and comparing is the laws 
and regulations in the surveyed countries8, in which the 
regulators` rights, responsibilities and relationships with 
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Figure 2．Independent Regulator ‒ Triangular Relationship and Indicators
８　All relevant legislations can be found at www.luatvietnam.
com.vn, www.mpt.gov.vn (Vietnamese version), the Public 
Gazette (English version, hard copy), www.minsvyaz.ru 
(Russian and English Version), and www.government.ru 
(Russian version).
171
others are legally prescribed. Obviously, the laws and 
regulations of different countries differ because they are 
means to reflect social, economic and political concerns of 
those countries, but they also act as a tool to express state 
policies on such subjects, and functional methodology is 
the most suitable method to make such a comparison 
(Markesinis, 1997, p.4).
Following the above Introduction, this paper is 
constructed as follows: Part 2 describes the establishment 
of the regulatory agencies and their responsibilities; Part 3 
analyzes the regulators in a triangular relationship context; 
subsequently, Part 4 examines regulatory decision making 
in the surveyed countries; and finally, Part 5 sets forth 
findings and proposals to overcome the observed regulatory 
deficiencies.
２ Establishment of the Regulators  and their responsibilities
The telecommunications regulatory body in Russia is 
t h e F e d e r a t i o n M i n i s t r y o f  I n f o r m a t i o n a n d 
Communications Technologies (MICT) - an executive 
agency which was restructured from the Ministry of Posts 
and Transportation in 2004 and is responsible for 
implementing state policies on telecommunications, posts 
and information.9 The MICT is in charge of policy-making 
initiatives and legal enactments pertaining to regulating 
communications, including developing and implementing 
basic policies and master plans, preparing bills of federal 
laws and other standard regulatory acts, and managing the 
development and expansion of the national information-
telecommunication infrastructure. There are several 
regulatory divisions within the MICT, which implement 
regulatory functions in related communications aspects:
• The Federal Service for Supervision controls 
operational aspects of the communication industry 
and is responsible for interconnection and licensing 
issues;
• The Federal Communication Agency administers 
state property, manages numbers and frequency 
assignment in detail; and
• The State Commission on Radio Frequencies 
(SCRF) governs the spectrum allocations.
Thus, the MICT performs the role of general policy 
maker, while other Federal Agencies under the MICT’s 
jurisdiction are responsible for the detailed functions of 
regulation.
In Vietnam, the Department General of Posts and 
Telecommunications (DGPT) was created in 1993 as a 
ministerial agency to separate policy and regulatory 
functions from operational functions. In 2002, the Ministry 
of Posts and Telematics (MPT) was established to replace 
t h e D G P T, a n d i t  i s  i n c h a rg e o f g o v e r n i n g 
telecommunications, post and information activities. Like 
its Russian counterpart, the MPT plays both the roles of 
p o l i c y  m a k e r  a n d  r e g u l a t o r  o f  p o s t s  a n d 
telecommunications.10 Some divisions of the MPT are 
responsible for specific regulatory functions involving 
certain telecommunications aspects; for example, the Radio 
Frequency Department is in charge of regulatory activities 
affecting spectrum allocation. However, other main mobile-
related issues like licensing, numbers and interconnection 
are directly regulated by the MPT.
３ The regulators in a Triangular   Relationship Context
3.1　Relationship with Mobile Operators
The first and foremost issue concerning the designation 
of “independent regulator” is whether the regulatory 
function is separated from the operating function (WTO, 
1996; Invent, 2000, pp.1-6) and whether these two 
activities are being implemented by different entities, to 
ensure that their benefits are not mixed and one entity 
cannot act both as a “referee” and as a “player.” It is 
observed that regulatory function is distinguished from 
operating function in the surveyed countries; Russia and 
Vietnam have separate authorities responsible for dealing 
with regulatory issues and are not in charge of operating 
functions. However, the significant question pertaining to 
the label “independent regulator” is whether the State holds 
any equity shares in the mobile companies, and particularly, 
whether the regulators have any specific ownership rights 
in those companies.
There are three national mobile operators in Russia: 
Megafon, which is authorized to provide services in all 89 
regions; and MTS and VimpelKom, which are licensed to 
provide services in 87 and 71 regions, respectively. None 
of these “big three” companies has any State ownership. 
However, the State directly owns 38% of the voting shares 
in the four regional mobile operators. Since the regional 
operators can only provide services in their authorized 
regions, they can neither be considered dominators in the 
mobile market nor competitors to the “big three.” To ensure 
independence between the MICT and mobile operators, the 
Federation is considering privatizing State ownership or 
９　Decree No.649 dated May 20, 2004, on Structural Issues of 
Federal Executive Authorities Decree No.649 dated May 20, 
2004, on Structural Issues of Federal Executive Authorities
10　The MPT’s structure, rights and responsibilities are 
prescribed in the Decree 90/2002/ND-CP, dated November 
11, 2002.
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restructuring the regional operators.11 Moreover, the MICT 
does not exercise any specific rights of state ownership of 
these regional operators. In Vietnam, all six mobile 
operators are nationwide licensed, must be state-owned, and 
are under the authorized state-ownership responsibility of 
the MPT.12 Nevertheless, the existence of 100% state-
owned capital in four out of six mobile operators, a majority 
ownership in the other two operators, and the above-noted 
authorization do not fully mean that the regulator treats all 
mobile operators in a fair and impartial manner. There are 
two major reasons that lead one to doubt the independence 
of the regulator. First, the regulator has a unique 
relationship with the incumbent Vietnam Posts and 
Telecommunications Group (VNPT) — who operates two 
different mobile networks and has been dominating the 
mobile market with a 75% mobile market share in 2005 
(MPT, 2006) — because it exercises ownership rights for 
the incumbent only, while other relevant ministries and 
organizations perform such roles for the other operators. 
Particularly, the MPT has the responsibility to propose 
candidates for all positions of the VNPT’s management 
board and has its own representative on that board.13 
Second, the VNPT operated under a monopoly scheme in 
all telecommunications services markets until the end of 
1997 and maintained such a role in the mobile market until 
2003, hence there is a close personnel relationship between 
the regulator and the incumbent; many employees who are 
currently working for the regulator previously worked for 
the incumbent operator, especially the regulator’s high-
ranking personnel.
3.2 Relationship with Other State 
Agencies
Theoretically, a regulator has greater independence if 
it has less interference from daily political pressure when 
performing regulatory activities and if it is not wholly 
funded by the political allocated budget (Invent, 2000; Wu, 
2005). In Russia, the MICT is headed by a minister who is 
appointed and dismissed by the president based on the 
prime minister’s proposal. No limitation is set on the 
minister’s term in office. However, a new prime minister 
may propose a new candidate for the position of minister, 
and the president has the right to approve any other 
candidate for the position of prime minister. Thus, 
candidates for the position of minister are strongly affected 
by political changes.
Further, complicated procedures among different 
governmental agencies are being applied in regulating the 
Russian mobile market, and the MICT is not independent in 
making decisions regarding licensing issues. In Russia, 
obtaining preliminary permits for using certain spectrums is 
a pre-condition when applying for a mobile acquisition 
license. The SCRF, which is in charge of frequency 
allocation, is an interdepartmental coordination body that is 
collectively formed by representatives of several federal 
ministries and agencies.14 The decisions on frequency 
allocation are made by the SCRF based on preliminary 
approval by the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Protection 
Service, the Federal Communication Agency and other 
concerned members of the SCRF. Once such approval is 
received, the SCRF makes the final decision on frequency 
allocation at its voting sessions.15 Based on the SCRF’s 
decision, the Federal Communication Agency assigns the 
frequency to the applicants, while the Federal Service for 
Supervision conducts the required licensing procedures.
Another important area in which the MICT is 
dependent on other federal ministries is the adoption of 
subordinate acts on information and communication 
technologies. All regulating acts that are developed by the 
MICT have to be approved by the government. Regulating 
acts require consensus among all federal ministers, and in 
some cases, require agreement by the heads of other federal 
executive authorities before being submitted to the 
government. In such a scenario, federal ministries or other 
federal executive authorities can block the adoption of the 
MICT’s proposed acts if they consider them unacceptable.
With regards to funding, all telecommunications fees 
collected in Russia, such as licensing fees and frequency 
usage fees, go into the Federation budget, and that budget 
covers the operational costs of all telecommunications-
related agencies.
On the other hand, the head of MPT of Vietnam is 
11　News obtained from the MICT site http://www.minsvyaz.
ru/news.shtml?n_id=4677
12　Article 1, Governmental Decree 90/2002/ND-CP dated 
November 11 , 2002 , on the Structure , Rights and 
Responsibilities of the MPT
13　Article 7, Decision 06/2006/QD-TTg dated January 9, 
2006, of the Prime Minister on the Establishment of Vietnam 
Posts and Telecommunications Group
14　The MICT, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Internal Defense, Federal Security Service, 
Federal Service for Supervision in Communications, Federal 
Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, 
Federal Agency of the Russian Federation on Technical 
Regulating and Metrology, Federal Communications Agency, 
Federal Agency for Informatization, Federal Space Agency, 
Federal Industry Agency, Federal Service for External 
Investigation, Federal Protection Service, Federal Agency 
for Press and Mass Media.
15　Since the SCRF is an interdepartmental body and combines 
representatives of different ministries and ministerial 
agencies who do not serve in the SCRF full time, all 
authorized matters are decided only at the SCRF’s sessions 
by voting. Related parties who are not satisfied with the 
SCRF’s decisions may bring their case to court.
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proposed by the prime minister, approved by the National 
Assembly and appointed by the president.16 The prime 
minister can also submit to re-designate or exempt the 
minister. Normally, a minister can serve up to the age of 60 
(for males) or 55 (for females), except:
• when he/she is a member of the National Assembly 
(in that case, the individual may keep the position 
past the age limit until his/her term in the National 
Assembly ends); or
• the minister is proposed to another position; or
• the minister did not duly perform the required duties 
and the prime minister asks him/her to be exempted17
In other words, the head of the regulatory agency is 
not heavily affected by daily political pressure and the 
minister has a suitable timeframe to pursue regulatory 
purposes.
However, the Vietnamese regulator is not fully 
independent in governing licensing. As prescribed by the 
current applicable laws and regulations,18 the MPT must 
consult with other relevant administrative agencies when 
processing applications for a mobile license, and the 
regulator can only grant a license to a successful applicant 
if such licensing is approved by the prime minister. 
Meanwhile, the legal framework neither specifies the terms 
and conditions that the prime minister should refer to when 
making a final decision, nor does it indicate which 
administrative agencies the regulator has to consult with. 
Such a mechanism causes both dependence and non-
transparency in the regulator’s activities.
The MPT is generally funded by the national budget, 
except for some regulatory divisions that have an 
independent financial mechanism, such as the Radio 
Frequency Department or the National Internet Center; 
these are fully funded by related collected fees.
3.3　Relationship with the Users
In competitive environments, the regulators` duties 
toward users are mainly ensuring universal access and 
protecting users` rights. These two issues are considerably 
focused upon by the regulators in the surveyed countries.
Overall, the mobile penetration rate in Russia reached 
86.5% as of 2005 (MICT, 2006), but such rates differed 
widely among the regions: the Moscow and Saint 
Petersburg areas had mobile penetration rates of 133.9% 
and 118.1%, respectively, while such rates in the two most 
under-developed areas in terms of mobile access, Ingushetia 
and Chukotka, were only 3.8% and 2.2%, respectively. 
Besides, the country had achieved barely a 30% fixed-line 
penetration rate by the end of 2005 (MICT, 2006). In order 
to mitigate the digital divide, the government has pledged 
universal service provisioning and established a Universal 
Service Fund. Since 2005, all operators are required to 
contribute 1.2% of their revenue to the Fund, excluding 
revenue from interconnection and traffic transmission 
services. As defined by the Communications Law (granted 
in 2003 and put into effect in 2004, hereinafter called the 
Law 2003), universal services include payphone and 
Internet access services, while universal service providers 
are either selected via tendering or appointed by the 
MICT,19 thereby only the four regional mobile service 
providers who are also licensed to provide fixed-services 
can benefit from the Fund. Consumer rights protection is 
ensured by the Law 2003, while the Civil Code and the 
Consumers Union of Russian Federation are responsible for 
dealing with user complaints.
Meanwhile, teledensity in Vietnam is still low in 
comparison with other regional countries (19.01%, of 
which fixed is 8.17% and mobile is 10.84% [MPT, 2006]). 
In 2004, the MPT established a Universal Services Fund, 
which is administered by the MPT and financed by 
contributions from operators, the national budget, and 
various international loans and aid. All mobile regulators 
have to contribute 5% of their revenue to the Fund. A 
surcharge for universal service obligations is also being 
calculated into interconnection charges. The concept of 
providing universal services in Vietnam is limited to the 
provisioning of fixed-telephone services,20 so that only four 
mobile licensees who are also authorized to provide fixed 
services can indirectly benefit from their contributions to 
the Fund. In addition to the Consumers` Rights Protection 
Association, the MPT is also responsible for protecting 
users` rights. However, current observations indicate that 
the users normally do not use this channel to voice their 
dissatisfactions with service provisioning. In the case of 
dissatisfaction, users normally make complaints via mass 
media channels, and mobile service providers may adjust 
their services as a result of the pressure exerted by the mass 
media.
16　Article 3, Law No 32/2001/QH10 dated December 25, 
2001, on the Structure, Rights and Responsibilities of the 
Government
17　Articles 5 and 20, Law No 32/2001/QH10 dated December 
25, 2001, on the Structure, Rights and Responsibilities of the 
Government
18　Article 46, Ordinance 43/2002/PL-UBTVQH10 dated 
June 7, 2002, on Posts and Telecommunications; Article 39, 
Decree 160/2002/ND-CP dated September 3, 2002, on 
Telecommunications
19　Universal service issues are prescribed in Chapter 8, 
Russian Communication Law 2003
20　Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg dated April 7, 2006 of the 
Prime Minister on the Approval of the Universal Services 
Provisioning Plan to 2010
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４ Regulatory Decision Making
The decision-making process in Russia and Vietnam 
basically satisfies two indicators: the availability of the 
legal framework on a regulatory website and the 
implementation of public hearings, whereby all applicable 
laws and regulations can be found on the regulators` 
websites and concerned parties are provided opportunities 
to raise their opinions on the drafts of many relevant 
regulations and decisions. However, problematic matters 
are being observed in those legal frameworks and 
regulatory personnel, as analyzed below.
4.1 Availability and Applicability of 
Related Laws and Regulations
In any competitive mobile environment, licensing, 
interconnection and fair allocation of scarce resources are 
considered key factors in facilitating the development of 
fair competit ion. Therefore, the availabili ty and 
applicability of laws and regulations pertaining to these 
topics will primarily indicate whether regulatory decisions 
are being well made in pursuit of such competition.
The Law 2003 delineated various responsibilities and 
interactions of Russia’s telecommunications authorities, as 
well as providing significant details on interconnection, 
licensing and frequency application procedures. However, 
the full applicability of the Law 2003 requires subordinate 
legal acts to be approved by the government, but such acts 
are still under consideration by various federal ministries 
and agencies. To manage frequency allocation, the 
government needs to approve frequency usage fees and a 
national spectrum allocation plan. Those drafts were 
developed and approved by the SCRF21 and sent to the 
MICT for further consideration and submission to the 
government for approval, but the governmental resolution 
on the initial unique formula for determining usage fees 
was blocked by the militarists, who are unwilling to pay for 
the broad range of frequencies that they have been allocated 
(about 91% of available radio-frequencies22). As a result, 
there are no specific rules to regulate frequency usage fees 
and spectrum allocation.
The delays in the adoption of legislation and the high 
dependence of the MICT on the Ministry of Defense for 
frequency allocation in Russia resulted in the development 
of a highly non-predictable regulatory decision–making 
process. In many cases, the regulator manages frequency 
allocation in an unfounded manner, assigning spectrum to 
one applicant without any feedback being provided to a 
previous applicant, or applying different frequency usage 
fees to different users of similar frequency bandwidths.23 
This has given rise to many conflicts among the operators, 
who lodged complaints to the Federal Antitrust Agency. On 
the 10th of April, 2006, the Federal Antitrust Agency made 
a proposal to the government to bring the SCRF under the 
government’s jurisdiction. The Federal Antitrust Agency 
argued that in order to ensure fair competition in the mobile 
market, the SCRF’s actions should be approved by the 
government rather than by the SCRF itself, as is the current 
practice. Besides, the International Tribunal in Zurich24 on 
May 16, 200625 concluded that the SCRF is de-facto 
controlled by the MICT since the MICT Minister heads the 
SCRF26 and the members of the Commission — during its 
voting sessions — are voting not for separate issues, but for 
the whole agenda.
The licensing procedure is also not fully prescribed. 
Although the Law 2003 contains detailed rules pertaining 
to licensing procedures, such prescriptions did not make 
them applicable or predictable. While the MICT holds 
exclusive licensing authority on the issuance, rejection, 
suspension and change of licenses, no clear selection 
criteria have been promulgated or clarified in the Law 
2003. Moreover, such exclusive authority allows the 
Ministry to apply different licensing requirements to 
different operators; it even allows the MICT to amend and 
change individual licenses` terms and conditions after 
issuance, because the Law 2003 fails to specify clear cases 
in which the regulator can make such changes. In addition 
to comparative evaluation, auctioning is currently 
promulgated as one of the licensing methods, though this 
new approach is not yet deployed by the Russian regulator.
On the other hand, in 2002, an Ordinance on Posts and 
Telecommunications was approved by the Steering 
Committee of the Vietnamese National Assembly. The 
Ordinance provides general rules and principles on 
21　Decision SCRF No.06-12-07-001 dated February 27, 2006
22　ComNews http://comnews.ru/index.cfm?id=23507&tempo=130
23　See news at 
http://www.cnews.ru/newtop/index.shtml?2005/11/16/ 
191646
http://www.newsite.ru/Megafon/Meganovosti/mega_news_ 
march2003/110403_egsm.htm
24　The International Tribunal in Zurich was examining a 
claim by the IPOC fund to recognize it as rightful owner of 
25 one-percent shares of Megafon (one the three biggest 
mobile operators in Russia) which are currently owned by 
Alfa Group.
25　ComNews, news on July 6, 2006, http://comnews.ru/index.
cfm?id=23472
26　Although the SCRF is an interdepartmental body, it is still 
under the jurisdiction of the MICT. According to the 2004 
Law, the SCRF is headed by the Minister of the MICT and 
deputed by the head of the Federal Communication Agency, 
who is appointed and dismissed by the government based on a 
proposal by the Minister of the MICT. Moreover, members of 
the SCRF are proposed by the chair of the Commission (i.e. 
Minister of the MICT) and approved by the government.
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governing posts and telecommunications issues, while it 
also contains articles on licensing, interconnection, 
spectrum allocation and numbering. Accordingly, the 
competent ministries released approximately 30 legal 
documents to detail the Ordinance on related issues.27 
Particularly, of those 30 documents, eight govern spectrums 
and six are dedicated to interconnection issues. However, 
one component of the scarce resources, a numbering plan, 
so far has not been covered by any detailed regulation. The 
lack of a national numbering plan that clearly defines 
numbers and prefixes that are to be reserved for different 
networks and services is causing operators — especially 
new entrants — to passively prepare for their network 
expansion. The recent unnecessarily-prolonged arguments 
among mobile operators on the allocation of new network 
access codes to the VNPT is a typical illustration of the 
problems that are being caused by the lack of a numbering 
plan.28 Further, licensing procedures are not properly 
regulated. The licensing is governed by articles of both the 
Ordinance on Posts and Telecommunications and the 
Decree on Telecommunications,29 but none of these 
documents define criteria to select successful applicants or 
the period of time to review applications for a license. 
Recent licensing activities have illustrated the regulator’s 
lack of competence in dealing with this tough issue and 
some licenses were granted without duly considering the 
licensees` potential financial resources and business 
competitiveness (World Bank Vietnam, 2006).
4.2　Regulatory Staff
Together with the availability of a predictable legal 
framework, impartial and timely regulatory decision 
making can be guaranteed if regulatory decision makers are 
qualified and experienced. However, it appears that the 
regulators in both countries have to address staff 
qualification issues. The two ministries are being funded by 
national budgets and staff salaries are significantly low in 
comparison to those of employees in telecommunications 
industries, thus the regulators are facing difficulties in 
retaining experienced and qualified personnel as well as 
recruiting new professionals. This problem is especially 
pronounced when foreign offices and mobile operators are 
trying to attract the regulators` experienced staff by offering 
higher salaries and good promotions. Research completed 
in June 2004 in Vietnam indicated that in approximately 
one year (mid-2003 to mid-2004), around 20 employees 
shifted their workplaces from the MPT to Viettel Mobile, a 
mobile operator that began operations in October 2003 
(Hong Mai, 2004).
５ Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1　Conclusion
The above analysis and comparison confirmed the 
research’s hypothesis that although several differences in 
mobile regulation exist between Russia and Vietnam, such 
as the level of state ownership in mobile operators, the 
impact of daily political change on the positions of the 
regulatory leaders, and the funding for those agencies, these 
two countries have the same typical deficiencies: a 
dependence on the regulators and a non-transparent 
regulatory decision making process. Such dependence and 
non-transparence in turn did not support the development of 
fair competition in the mobile markets.
This research showed that telecommunications 
regulators in both countries are dependent on other state 
agencies/authorities in deciding one of the most important 
regulatory issues – licensing. While the MPT of Vietnam 
has to consult with other relevant state agencies and obtain 
approval from the prime minister when deciding to choose 
a successful applicant for a license, the Russian MICT is 
required to get preliminary approval from the Ministry of 
Defense on matters pertaining to the same issue.
Both regulatory agencies depend (partly in Vietnam 
and wholly in Russia) on national budgets to cover 
regulatory expenses, including salaries for staff. These 
salaries are considerably low in comparison to salaries paid 
by the industries, such that the regulators are facing 
difficulties in keeping and recruiting qualified personnel. 
Low salaries may result in staff corruption or neglect of 
regulatory responsibilities, which in turn could result in 
further unfairness in the decision-making process.
On the other hand, deficiencies in the legislative 
frameworks also brought about a lack of fairness in decision 
27　This number does not include documents that regulate 
tariﬀs, as since before 2004, each tariﬀ must be approved by 
a specific legal decision of the MPT; and from 2004, all 
tariffs provided by the dominator(s) must also receive such 
approval.
28　Currently, mobile network access codes in Vietnam are 
numbered by 09x, which means a maximum of 10 different 
access codes are available. As of January 2006, six diﬀerent 
access codes have been already assigned to six mobile 
networks. The incumbent’s application for two other mobile 
access codes in January 2006 caused a serious argument 
among mobile operators, since a legal numbering plan does 
not yet exist and new entrants argued that it was unfair while 
there were only two access codes reserved for the other four 
mobile networks. The new entrants unwillingly accepted the 
regulator’s allocation when this organization declared the 
intention to reserve numbers from 010 to 017 for mobile 
access codes. See more at http://www.vnpost.mpt.gov.vn/
bao_2006/so05/bcvt/t7b3.htm and http://vietnamnet.vn/cntt/
vienthong/2006/01/531907/.
29　Ordinance 43/2002/PL-UBTVQH10 dated June 7, 2002 
and Decree 160/2002/ND-CP dated September 3, 2004
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making. The responsible authorities in both countries have 
not enacted all necessary legal documents to regulate the 
mobile sectors, for example, a numbering plan is not in 
effect in Vietnam, while a spectrum allocation plan and 
unique frequency usage fees are still under consideration 
for approval in Russia. Further, the current legal 
frameworks exhibit several confusing and/or illogical 
prescriptions, such as stipulations on licensing in Vietnam 
and the possibility of cancellation of previously-made 
decisions on frequency allocation by the SCRF in Russia.
More than a few reasons can be used to explain the 
regulatory dependence in the surveyed countries; two of 
them are:
• the existence of a centrally-planned mechanism for 
a significant period of time, where the economies 
were primarily managed by administrative orders 
and the relationships between governmental 
agencies and their regulated enti t ies were 
psychologically accepted as necessary relationships 
between “givers and askers” on a broad, national 
scale; and
• the limitation of capabilities in creating legislative 
frameworks that are applicable to competitive, 
market-based environments and in compliance with 
basic international rules and principles.
It is noteworthy that the challenge of creating an 
independent regulator of telecommunications is facing not 
only Russia and Vietnam, but also other transitional 
countries such as China (USTR, 2004, p.79; Roseman, 
2005, pp.15-16).
5.2　The Need to Establish Independent 
Regulators
The challenges in licensing, and consequently, 
challenges in managing important regulatory issues like 
allocation of scarce resources in a fair and transparent 
manner require the countries to strengthen the regulators 
and their existing regulatory decision making. Creating a 
good decision-making process and an independent 
regulatory agency is especially important when the two 
countries further integrate into global markets and become 
WTO members.30 Currently, the related parties can file a 
complaint case with the responsible authorities in the host 
countries or with limited authorities under related bilateral 
agreements if the regulators treat them unfairly, but when 
the two countries become WTO members, such parties can 
use their rights to file a complaint case with various 
responsible international dispute settlement organizations. 
This will lead to a much more complicated scenario and not 
result in any benefit to the regulator if any unfair treatment 
is perceived.
5.3　Proposals to Establish Independent 
Regulators
5.3.1　 Creating/Strengthening Independent 
Regulators
Establishing multi-sector regulators in the surveyed 
countries is impossible in the short-run, since competitive 
situations in different industries are largely different. On the 
one hand, creating new organizations under the direct 
control of the governments will increase the independence 
of such agencies because it removes layers in which the 
regulators have to be reported to and governed by; but on 
the other hand, such creation requires a significant amount 
of time and complicated procedures.31 In the short term, the 
most realizable way is forming and/or strengthening quasi-
independent regulators inside the ministries and upgrading 
the current quasi-independent regulator(s). These entities 
are quasi-independent if they do not satisfy all independent 
indicators; for instance, they are neither funded by the 
national budget nor have any relationship with operators, 
but are partially independent from state agencies because 
they are under the ministries` jurisdiction: they are created 
by and their leaders are appointed based on the ministers` 
submission.
Spectrum issues are already managed by the quasi-
independent organizations in the surveyed countries (the 
SCRF in Russia and the Radio Frequency Department in 
Vietnam). These entities should be upgraded to be fully 
independent by separating them from the ministries and 
bringing them under the direct jurisdiction of the 
governments. Quasi-independent regulators inside the 
ministries should be formed (in Vietnam) or strengthened 
(two MICT Federal agencies in Russia), and authorized to 
address other regulatory responsibilities, such as licensing, 
numbering, interconnections, anti-trust and user rights 
protection. Further, the management of the spectrum issue 
is the most typical characteristic of mobile regulation, and 
so far, it is the only difference between governing fixed and 
mobile telecommunications. Consequently the quasi-
independent regulators should be in charge of managing 
telecommunications as a whole, not just the mobile 
30　Vietnam is possibly becoming a WTO member this year, 
while Russia is in the ﬁnal steps toward the membership. See 
more at the WTO homepage, Accession.
31　In Vietnam, creating a new governmental agency requires 
the Prime Minister’s agreement and approval of the National 
Assembly (Law on the Structure and Responsibilities of the 
Government)
177
communications market.
In Russia, the separation of two federal regulatory 
agencies inside the MICT is ensured by the respective 
regulations but not by the Law 2003. The only specific 
organization whose responsibilities are described in the 
Law is the SCRF. Basically, the Law 2003 is quite 
adaptable and allows different interpretations depending on 
accepted legal acts. Existing structural separation should be 
strengthened by setting forth the respective powers of these 
federal agencies in the Law 2003 and by allowing them to 
de te rmine year ly work ing and f inanc ing p lans 
independently from the MICT.
The most controversial issue in regulating the mobile 
market in Russia is frequency management. The SCRF is 
an interdepartmental coordination body within the control 
of the MICT and, at the same time, depends on the expertise 
of the federal military bodies. Such interdependence 
constrains the sole power of the members, but that does not 
ensure an impartial or objective decision-making process. 
Moreover, in a situation where the federal military bodies 
are actually exercising the rights of frequency ownership on 
behalf of the State, the efficiency of frequency spectrum 
management can not be made certain by the MICT. 
Therefore, to increase independence in regulating frequency 
spectrum, the influence of both the MICT and the military 
bodies should be reduced or eliminated by bringing the 
SCRF under the government’s direct jurisdiction and by 
specifying frequency usage rights. The approval of 
frequency usage fees, as foreseen by the Law 2003, will 
clarify the frequency terms for all users and speed up the 
liberation of unused frequencies by the militarists. Besides 
the situation of its subordination to the MICT, the 
membership of the SCRF should also be revised. The Law 
2003 requires that the SCRF consists of representatives of 
all interested federal executive authorities. However, the 
examination of electromagnetic controversies and the 
determination of available frequency spectrum are solely 
conducted by concerned members whose positive 
conclusions are necessary to bring a decision on frequency 
allocation to a vote, while voting is done by all the 
members. In this case, it is not really clear on what criteria 
the decisions of other members are made. If the decision on 
frequency allocation doesn’t infringe on interests of the 
majority of the members, their interference can result in the 
manipulation of final decisions by the interested parties. 
Therefore, it is necessary to strictly define the concept of 
concernment and to narrow current membership 
accordingly.
To make these regulatory bodies as independent as 
possible, funding for them should not be extracted wholly 
from national budgets, and should be covered by various 
fees — such as licensing fees or scarce resources usage fees 
— or by contributions of operators. Experience with 
managing frequency in Vietnam proved that the regulatory 
framework and decision-making process would be more 
effective if the agency in charge were funded by collected 
fees; the agency strived to draft and submit all necessary 
legal documents for regulating its sector since its revenue 
depended on collected fees, and to be possible to collect 
such fees, the agency would have to be provided a clear 
legal framework to exercise its duties. Additionally, such 
stipulations cannot be in favor of any mobile operators.32 
The relevant collected fees are significant. In Vietnam, 
annual collected mobile number usage fees may reach 
around US$4 million.33 In Russia, according to the Vice 
Minister of the MICT, mobile operators pay about US$51.9 
million yearly for frequency usage.34 With the future 
conversion of at least one fourth of the spectrum reserved 
for militarists, yearly frequency payment to the budget can 
rise by US$259-296 million. Such significant financial 
resources could be used to cover the cost of regulatory 
activities and help the regulators to keep/recruit qualified 
staff by paying adequate salaries.
5.3.2　Improving Legislative Framework
Independent regulators cannot implement their 
activities in a transparent manner if they are not being 
provided with the necessary legal basis or if the basis is not 
well-designed, even though they do not institutionally or 
financially depend upon any external sources. As analyzed 
in the previous sections, there are several legal documents 
that need to be enacted or revised by the responsible 
authorities in Russia and Vietnam.
In Russia, these activities include, but are not limited 
to:
• the i n c l u s i o n o f p o w e r s o f t h e F e d e r a l 
32　The spectrum issue is regulated by eight legal documents 
in Vietnam. The spectrum allocation plan and the table of 
frequency usage fees are available and predictable, all mobile 
operators are treated equally in allocating spectrum and 
paying usage fees.
33　The authors` calculation based on the mobile usability 
assigned to mobile operators and rates applied to numbers` 
usage in Vietnam. Yearly fee/usable number is 1000 
Vietnamese dong. Eight network access codes are assigned to 
six mobile operators, while each network access code has 
8,000,000 usable numbers (the length of a mobile subscription 
number is 10 digits, of which 3 digits are network access 
code. Numbers begin by 0 or 1 are not applicable, since 0 is 
used for identifying domestic long distance calls and 1 is used 
to identify special services). The annual collected fee number 
will be 1,000 x 8,000,000 x 8 = 64,000,000,000 Vietnamese 
dong, equivalent to around US$4 million (US$1 ≈ 16 000 
Vietnamese dong as informed by the State Bank of Vietnam 
on October 23, 2006 http://www.sbv.gov.vn/home/index.asp)
34　ComNews http://comnews.ru/index.cfm?id=23507&tempo=130
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Communication Agency and the Federal Service for 
Supervision in the Law 2003;
• the revision and clarification of regulations 
pertaining to the SCRF; and
• the enactment of frequency usage fees, national 
f requency a l loca t ion t ab les and re levan t 
subordinating acts.
In Vietnam, the responsible authorities should 
implement at least the following modifications:
• clearly defining selection licensing criteria and 
authorizing all licensing duties exclusively to the 
regulator;
• enac t i ng a number ing p l an and r ev i s ing 
interconnection regulations; andabolishing the 
authorization of State ownership rights in VNPT to 
the MPT and transferring such authorization to 
another State agency, for instance the Ministry of 
Finance, in order to decrease the inter-dependence 
between the MPT and the incumbent.
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